An Alternative
Paradigm for Human Solidarity: A Levinasian Perspective
Introduction
This paper is an
attempt to suggest an alternative view from a philosophical standpoint that
could serve as a possible paradigm for human solidarity. But before delving on
this topic, this paper will first present the fundamentality of solidarity in
human existence. Then this fundamentality will be explained in terms of the
social dimension of our existence. Afterwards, it will evaluate the paradigm behind
the limited way for solidarity, which seems to defeat the purpose of
solidarity. After the exposition of the inadequacy of such paradigm, this paper
will explore the thoughts of Emmanuel Levinas whose advocacy to be responsible
for others is seen as a significant idea in an attempt to find for a
philosophical alternative view that could possibly be effective for human
solidarity. In particular, this paper will focus on Levinas’s two basic concepts:
The Other whose infinity contained in the face names the Other’s incomprehensible
character which is the stepping stone in the idea of responsibility; and the
Third Party as a threshold for all others where solidarity among all others
will be established. This paper will end by presenting the implication of Levinas’
thoughts in view of their relevance to present the paradigm for human
solidarity.
Part I: Human Solidarity and Its Problem
Solidarity
as Fundamental in Human Existence[1]
Human existence begins
and ends with solidarity. Our individual birth for instance is not a solitary
event that merely marks the history of our personal life, but also in the lives
of many others, especially those immediate to us such as our family. Because of
our birth, they are moved into one in their desire for a successful delivery
and in their experience of thrill and joy to see our presence. It would mean then
that new relationship emanating from this new life is added to their lives. Our
birth affects them in terms of bringing to them a spring of hope and
inspiration to live a fuller way of life.
Although this
solidarity that is there in our birth appears vividly in our family, this
solidarity in birth is there even beyond this limited circle. It is an integral
part of our human experience that we take joy in the appearance of a new baby.
Even when the child is not related to us, its presence somehow gives us a
lovingness of joy. We sense that this baby, be it Asian, American, African or
European, is a new addition to our human family. Our lives have been amplified
when this child is born. If this child, for instance, is hungry, we have a
vague sense or inner feeling of obligation that we should provide food for him
or her. This marks that beyond relatedness every human baby is in some way part
of our lives.
Death, on the other
hand, also possesses an element where human solidarity is experienced. We may
perceive death as an event for an individual alone, a totally individual
experience. Heidegger, for instance, in Being and Time, will consider death as
something which an individual experiences in a completely individual way. The
idea is: I die as an individual and no one else dies with me. In opposition to
Heidegger’s position is the human experience that death is not completely
solitary. In our dying moment, we acknowledge in us our desire for our immediate
family members to be there with us, to be together wherein, ideally, we bid
farewell to them and them to us. It is in this togetherness that a sense of
solidarity is manifested.
Our death has a
profound significance which transcends even outside the circle of our immediate
family and friends. It calls for our awareness that our community and the
entire humanity will henceforth be lacking something. Our death affects them
for our presence makes a difference in some time. When we die our contributions to their lives
will have their end thus creating a vacuum to their lives. Although our loss
may not be printed in a modern newspaper, we know for a fact that it will be a
significant loss. At times when there is a feeling of emptiness within because
of a loss of someone, we find ourselves filled in the presence of our family
members and in the sympathy of others. Even in funerals and burials, we like to
pay homage to express our being one in the moment of pain and sorrow. (I think
of the death of the late President Corazon Aquino.) In the case of death, we
realize the value of togetherness. Hence, our deaths reveal our oneness with
other people.
These
phenomena (our birth and our death) mark the significance of solidarity in our
lives. It is given. It’s always with us. However, making such a claim leaves no
questions. What makes solidarity fundamental in our human existence? What could be the possible root to explain
this fundamentality?
Why are we capable for solidarity?
From
this point, I would like to explain the fundamentality of solidarity from the
social dimension of our human existence. We may be unique different individuals
separate from one another but we are also individuals who are also with others,
through others and for others. John Donne says “no man is an island”. We cannot
deny that we need others and they need us.
Solidarity
and Sociality[2]
Every
aspect of our human existence is social. The others are always presupposed in
any individual activities. We live with other human beings. My study for
example makes sense because they are also taken up by other persons. I deal
with my teachers, my classmates, and my fellow students in school. This is
usually what a student does. In this case, I am inevitably in contact with
other people. Even in the activities that I perform alone such as studying
individually is social in character. I may not perform them with others but I
learn to do it from others, I do it through others and for others.[3]
My ability to read and write, for instance, is because of my parents at home and
teachers in school who taught me since childhood. Hence, reading and writing
have their marks of influence in my parents and teachers. Moreover, the pencil
or pen, papers and books that I use in my studying are products of other
people. Through them, I could possibly use materials for my study. Also, the
fact that I am able to study signifies the presence of others especially my
parents whose support, either financially or morally, is constant. Through
them, my study in some way is made possible. In addition, my study is also not merely
driven by my selfish motives. I study that I may help maybe to my immediate family
members first and then to others in the future. Hence, I study for others although
I study alone.
In
his article, The Social Dimensions of
Human Existence, Manuel Dy Jr. further explains that even in our desire just
to be alone is social for the reason that this desire might be the effect of
other’s pressures, or because we would like to improve our relationship with
others through our solitary reflection or because maybe we would like to give
an impression for being independent from others.[4]
Hence,
given that human existence is social in everything; solidarity is always possible.
When we choose to be in solidarity, it would possibly come into the view. Our
sociality thus brings us into the zone of solidarity. Because of this, solidarity has its place of significance
to bring it into discussion. However, what is human solidarity? How do we
define it?
Solidarity in
“Sameness” as its Primary Basis and its Problem
Human
solidarity is defined in various forms. Dictionary defines solidarity as “unity
of interests, sympathies, etc., as among members of the same class”[5]
Human solidarity, moreover, is understood also as “founded on mutual respect of
each other’s uniqueness and a deep sense of appreciation of our common
humanity”[6]
Lastly, human solidarity is “conceived as a reciprocal practice”.[7]
Cohesiveness is achieved in a symmetrical relationship.
Different as they may appear, the definitions
given above have in common in their basis for solidarity i.e. according to
“sameness”. The first definition implies that solidarity would come into the
picture when everyone manifests a common interests and sympathies. We gather
for the same cause, the same purpose, the same goal etc. Notice that there is
an idea of commonality of interests or sympathies which leads to unity. This
commonality could better be identified as bottom line where the “sameness” lies,
making the unity possible. In this case, there could never be unity when there
is no oneness and there could never be oneness without having things in common.
In other words, unity comes when there is a sense of likeness. Expounding the
second and the third definitions, solidarity is established when everyone
manifests the same attitudes or
goals or interests or understandings to
everyone. We must do the same thing to others according to what they have done
to us. When we received respect, respect must also be given. In this regard, what
drives human to solidarity is the idea of ‘the same”. Hence, sameness is what
holds humans together to have a sense of solidarity. Although there could be
differences but ultimately solidarity rests on a certain kind of sameness or
“things in common”. From this vantage point, I would like to deal with the idea
of solidarity as a form of togetherness (organization, groups, association etc)
driven by essential reason where its primary basis is the idea of commonality
or “sameness”.
This
conception of human solidarity can be traced back to the Greek philosophical
tradition, especially found in Aristotle’s model of friendship. In returning to
Aristotle’s form of friendship we find an emphasis on sameness as source of
bond.[8]
This account of friendship, as objective-centered, seeks some objective
qualities—specific values, virtues or understanding—of a friend to explain a
friendly bond.[9] The
common values or understanding of friends ensure that they will share affective
and rational apprehensions of any ethical situations. This commonality of
virtues is clearly specified in some elements of Aristotle’s account of prefect
friendship.[10]
First,
one loves a true friend for his own sake. All forms of friendship require love
of the friend for his own sake; only in perfect friendship, however, does this translate
into love of the other for what he essentially is, since virtue is central to a
good man’s character. True friendship thus is defined by the sameness of
friends in their virtue; good men are attracted to one another in friendship
because ‘like is dear to like’.[11]
Second
and lastly, true friend is another self. Perfect friendship involves making our
friend’s fortunes your own: he becomes another self; his pleasure and pains
known as if they were yours. So Aristotle repeatedly suggests that true friends
share ‘a single soul’ and that a true friend is ‘a second self.’ The expansion
of the boundaries of concern to include a friend is helped along by the likeness
of desires and aversions implied by habituation into shared excellence.[12]
Using
Aristotle’s objective account of friendship leads us to his notion of civic
solidarity, where the common features of character is the basis of drawing us
together. Everyone must relate on the basis of shared understanding. A
successful statesman for instance must cultivate in himself like-mindedness among
citizens about the definitions of virtue and justice in a state.[13]
For Aristotle then, the bonds between citizens are unequivocally premised on
sameness, providing the basis for stable solidarity.[14]
Because
Aristotle sees bond on the plane of sameness, he treats differences as
detracting from the relationship. For Aristotle, difference is a sign of deficiency
in a friendship. On Aristotle’s account, if my friend and I differ in anything relating
to the ethical life, this is either a call for me to bring myself into line or
sign that my friend may not be my equal in virtue (which would immediately
threaten our friendship). There can of course be differences between perfect
friends: while Aristotle sees the ethical domain as expansive, the life of
circumstances of virtuous men will differ, and such men may hold differentiated
social roles (from among the following the full development of virtues). Yet to
the extent that a canonically defined human good leaves room for some
differences in the affects and life plans of virtuous men, attentiveness to
such differences is not thought by Aristotle to be constitutive of true
friendship. Where such differences cannot be ignored as non-ethical, they
imperil a friendship.[15]
Thereof,
I would like to affirm a sort of influence from Aristotle in the definition of
solidarity enumerated above. Aristotle’s theory of friendship, either personal
or civic, is clearly identifiable in one of our concepts of solidarity. Both have
come to use sameness as ground of coming together or friendship. Although the
ideas of solidarity presented take in different forms and different ways but ultimately
they rest on a certain commonality. So sameness becomes the primary foundation
for solidarity.
The
thought of Aristotle is indeed a good starting point for solidarity but its
inadequacy lies when it does not also attend to differences. This conception would only yield a kind of
violence and division. In our present condition,
there are somehow marks of influences of such conception of solidarity (based
on sameness) which leaves some marks of social problems in our society.
One
social problem brought about by the idea of sameness is the “frat” violence. Despite,
as we may say, the high ideals of fraternities, acts of violence and hostilities
inevitably overshadow such ideals. Undeniably, there are events of violent
confrontation between rival fraternities causing injuries to every member. The common act of violence is generally called
as “rumble”. Everyone in a fraternity clashes against the other members of a rival
fraternity. This event is not new to us especially those who happen to have in
contact with members of many different fraternities. And still this violence exists among
fraternities. Fraternity, in this sense, becomes nothing more than the
dangerous prattle of the spoiled, attention-hungry boy whose self-worth is
defined by the capacity to inflict pain, destruction and even death on others.[16]
In
this event, one could question the reason behind this violence. In my own
perspective, I see that hostility among some members of rival fraternities is
the failure to respect the difference of every fraternity. The tendency to
limit brotherhood or sisterhood only to those who belong to same fraternity could
be the possible reason for such violence. Because of such conception, one is
ready to inflict pain to other members of different fraternities or one is
ready to fight for the brotherhood of the same fraternity. The others who have
different fraternities are seen as threats or enemies simply because they
belong to a different fraternity. Brotherhood or sisterhood, in this case,
turns to have exclusivity. As a result, solidarity in terms of having things in
common sometimes could yield violence and division. (Although there could be
more concrete situations that manifest such a problem, I chose this as the
subject of my problem as stepping stone to consider the wider perspective.)
If solidarity would
ultimately rests on the idea of commonality such as what is presented above,
then it could be better to search for an alternative view that sustains solidarity
despite differences. We can no longer absolutely rely on the paradigm of solidarity
founded on the idea of “sameness” for, as we see, it reveals to us its flawed
assumptions. We have to explore on other horizon that can accommodate for our
search. And if we are to look closely, there is no need to trace back as far as
ancient philosophical traditions for this search. Emmanuel Levinas, one of the widely
respected thinkers of our century provides us a worldview that could serve as a
possible paradigm for human solidarity.
Part II: Emmanuel Levinas on The
Other, and The Third Party
The
Other and the Call to Responsibility
The first truth that I find myself before the Other is that the Other reveals
herself as Other, separate and different from me. Although
there is a clear essential identity as human being that resembles the Other and
me, which Levinas does not deny, it does not, however, reduce the radical
alterity the Other presents.[17]
And by being other offers me no place in
grasping her within the horizon of being in general and in possessing her. Levinas
says “that which escapes comprehension in the other (autrui) is her” as other.[18]
Levinas uses the idea of infinity to represent the irreducibility of the
Other. This so-called infinity is contained and unraveled in the Other’s face.[19] However,
in what way does this infinity reveal in the face? What does Levinas mean by
the “face”? Levinas does not merely mean
the literal perception of the face consisting of the eyes, forehead, ears,
lips, etc. but rather in the manner the Other presents herself as other i.e. irreducible
and transcendent. In a conversation with Philippe Nemo, Levinas remarks that “the relation with the face can surely be
dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face is cannot be reduced
to that.”[20]
The face itself, in its exposure, has an element of uprightness because it takes
no defense. In its exposure, I can do anything to it because it is which that
stays most naked and most destitute. But it is also which forbids me to do
against it. Levinas, to attests this poverty, cites our putting on poses and
taking on countenance on our face. Moreover, the face is
signification without context. For its signification, in a usual sense of the
term, is not relative to a particular context. In other words, the meaning of the
face is not in its relation to another thing. We cannot just simply identify the
face for example by its being a son of affluent family, or in the manner of
presenting herself, or in the way of behaving, or in physical features, etc. “The face is meaning all by itself. You are
you.”[21]
In this description of the face, one can say that the face is not merely an
appearance of itself but rather it is what eludes the embrace of my categorical
thought.[22] This further
suggests that to look at the face is to look at the Other’s radical alterity.[23]
To clarify further, Levinas employs the term ‘epiphany’. Levinas
associates “epiphany” with the “manifestation” of the Other’s otherness. The
appearance of the Other is characterized not just by “being there”. By “being
there” entails the allowing of the ego to comprehend the Other in the horizon
of being in general. But in the face-to-face encounter with the Other, I am not
facing a thing that I can perceive and reduce to either an object of my
enjoyment or to my egoistic concepts through my grasping hand and intellect.[24] This
event unravels the Other’s refusal to be contained and to be comprehended
against the “totalizing system”[25]. Thereof, the Other, by its appearance, commands
a response different from knowledge. Although inevitably I have knowledge of
the Other’s manifestation and the demands put on me, but the epiphany needs a
response beyond my pretheoretical perspective. Hence by the Other’s simply
appearance, she also gives commands.
But how can I give assurance that the command coming from the Other will
not appear as something authoritative, and does not lead to a form of violence,
maybe because of my egoistic reaction? How can the Other commands me without
oppressing me? In other words, how can this opposition and demand of the Other be
situated in an ethical form?[26]
The command is ethical for it calls for duty not in the form of
compelling, bribery, or manipulation.[27] Despite
the supremacy of the Other he does not try to take control over me the way my
egoism does but rather in his poverty. In the words of Levinas:
The first word of the face is the “Thou shall not
kill.” It is an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as
if a master spoke to me. However, at the same time, the face of the Other is
destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all. And me,
whoever I may be, but as a “first person,” I am he who finds the resources to
respond to the call.”[28]
Thereof, Levinas tells us that the other challenges me through his
destitution. He challenges me from his height and from his humility as well.[29] What makes
the command ethical is the virtue of her destitution because she neither
imposes her will on me nor subjugate my freedom but rather, commands my
generosity and compassion.[30] In
this event, the command works as a form of an invitation and a welcome from her
that moves me to draw myself near her and to do my responsibility for her as my
neighbor without my being commanded nor forced by her or anything. If I recognize the
command, it shatters my egoism and breaks myself away from self-preoccupation.
This is because in acknowledging such a command I also simultaneously move
toward the other to respond, to become responsible. Having said yes to this
command is a kind of transcendence and a realization of my own humanity because
I permit myself to an ethical relation with the other.[31]
Thus the command through the epiphany of
the face reveals the ethical dimension
of my humanity.
When the Other appeals to me, the humble plea does not merely appeal to my
goodness but particularly to my responsibility. The ultimate command is responsibility. Responsibility
here is of course understood as responsibility for the Other not just responsibility
for my own deed. It transcends the field of my egoism toward what does not
matter to me.[32]
This responsibility is concretely expressed by doing good for the Other and giving
oneself for the service of the Other without waiting for reciprocity. The
Other’s responsibility in my regard is her affair.
In this case, I must have a generous orientation toward the Other even if the
Other does not assume her responsibility on me.
Speaking further,
Levinas considered responsibility as my fundamental structure. This goes to
follow that responsibility precedes my freedom. Levinas says that “I am
responsible for him without even having taken
on responsibilities in his regard; his responsibility is incumbent on me.”[33]
In this sense it could “be considered a priori”.[34]
It is there without my choosing it. Accordingly, this makes my capability to be
responsible possible. Moreover, it also
makes it clear that my “unicity” with the other is in a completely different
way. The tie between me and the Other is not under comprehension or perception
which goes towards adequation but as a matter of responsibility. In a
conversation with Philippe Nemo, Levinas says:
The
tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility, this moreover, whether
accepted or refused, whether knowing or not knowing how to assume it, whether
able to or unable to do something concrete for the Other. To give. To be human
spirit, that’s it.[35]
Moreover, the above
statement also reveals an idea of a fundamental option. The face turns directly
toward me and me alone—face-a-face. I
must answer. And “how I answer depends on my freedom. I must say “yes” but I can
say “no”.”[36]
Hence, although part of me is being responsible for others, it does not
ultimately discard my freedom. But if I commit myself positively to be
responsible for the other, this responsibility would bring me to fraternal
close to her in a bond of solidarity. I would then make myself available and
declare: “me voice—“Here I am”.”[37]
Sociality
and the Third Party
Notice that in the
previous discussion, I seem to present merely a relation involving of two
persons, the Other and the I. I discuss that the manifestation of the Other
calls for a welcoming response the face signifies. Obedience to this demand
reveals that I use my freedom to take responsibility for the Other. But what about
my relation to another Other who is beside and behind the immediate Other? Is
my relation consists only of a single Other?
Levinas does not ignore
the presence of the other Other. The You appearing in the epiphany of the face is
not particular and privatized, but universal. The Other does not seek
clandestine intimacy but places itself in the full light of revelation. Language
could testify that being able to speak, for instance, reveals the fact that the
other and the I belong to a certain language community. It is something that is
actually shared with. In the epiphany of the Other, the third also looks at me.[38]
Levinas says:
Language
as the presence of the face, does not invite complicity with the preferred
being, the self-sufficient ‘I-Thou’ forgetful of the universe; in its frankness
it refuses the clandestinity….The third party also looks at me in the eyes of
the other….[39]
When I meet the naked
face of this one Other, I am also with all others, who call to me just humbly
and with just as much imperative as does this one Other standing before me.[40]
As Levinas puts it:
The
epiphany of the face opens up humanity….the presence of the face, the infinity
of the Other, is a destituteness, a presence of the third (that is, of the
whole of humanity which looks at us)….[41]
It is for this reason
that Levinas considered the I-Other relation as “social relation” or simply as
sociality. The otherness of the other has an essentially social extension: his
alterity contains an immediate reference to all others. Therefore, the third
seems to be the name for the Other inasmuch as the Other is multiple and
anonymous but always having a face and speech.[42]
It seems then that our
“universal” kinship does not derive from some common quality or qualities but of
an ethical structure or character. As our usual basis of identification, race
for instance refers everything to “likeness” or “sameness”—to one’s own race, one’s
own people, and one’s own blood—so that the ‘others’, those who do not belong
to my race, people, or blood, are excluded all the way if necessary, to the
point of denial or even annihilation (holocaust). To the contrary, a truly
humane kinship includes all others precisely on the basis of their otherness
and difference, as expressed in the face.[43]
Implication
on Human Solidarity
Human
solidarity, in its tendency to take “sameness” as its primary basis, has proven
itself to be inadequate and limited. What
has resulted from this viewpoint is a kind of “categorical” solidarity. We see
it in the example given above. Different groups of organizations of people bringing
the spirit of solidarity with their own unified visions come into the picture. However,
they do not just emerge but incite divisions and violence.
Emmanuel Levinas, in
his own philosophy, take another paradigm for human solidarity. In the above
discussion, he has clearly opposed the kind of relation with the Other in terms
of comprehension which reduce the Other into the horizon of The Same. Speaking
of this, my dealing with the Other must not be basically according to sameness.
Levinas suggests that my relation with
the Other is irreducible to this kind of apprehension. Consequently, for
Levinas, solidarity is not primarily caused for having the same purpose,
interests, and goals. Because of this, we could see Levinas’ opposition to
Aristotle’s model of friendship. Aristotle advocates commonality as the basis for
friendship and even in the civic friendship. And we see that sameness is rooted in
objectivity. Unlike Aristotle’s model of friendship, Levinas upholds the
otherness of the Other. The alterity of the Other contained in the face reveals
to me her difference and at the same time opens up an idea of infinity which signifies
the irreducibility of the Other. What eludes in my comprehension is the
otherness of the other. With this, the Other gives her refusal to be contained
in a totalizing system. This refusal simultaneously poses a command for me. The
command, as we see, is a call for responsibility to the Other. Hence, from the
otherness of the Other emanates responsibility. And when I response to this
call, it is a responsibility that binds the Other and the me.
Speaking broadly, Levinas’ idea
about the ethical relationship with the Other has its significance to my
relationship to all Others and establish a new structure of solidarity. In his
book, Totality and Infinity, he calls
it (all others) as the third party which
is basically referred to the “whole of humanity”[44].
The manifestation of the third is seen in the epiphany of the Other’s face. The
face of the Other, as it manifests, attests the presence of the third because
the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity. And since all Others,
independent of whether I have met them or not, have faces, they look at me for
the same reason with the Other whose face and words reach me here and now.
Although I cannot get to know everyone, this does not exempt my response for
them the I must response to the Other. They appeal to my devotion like the
Other. Given such an exposition, this will entail that my response is not
merely confined to the immediate Other but also extended to the other Others
which basically termed as “the third”. Hence,
Levinas clearly opt for responsibility for the Other as the basis for a humane
society. Levinas says:
That
all men are brothers is not explained by resemblance, nor by a common cause….It
is responsibility before a face looking at me as absolutely foreign (and the
epiphany of the face coincides with these two moments) that constitutes the
original fact of fraternity.[45]
Thus, it is not “sameness”
that binds us in drawing us together but responsibility. The comprehension driven
by an idea of “things in common” is not an appropriate measure in solidarity. The
point is that despite any differences in the level of understandings or
advocacies I could still be in solidarity with other people. In view of such
situation, what drives me to do as such is responsibility.
With all this, I
believe that the concept of Levinas particularly being responsible for all
others would pave the way to a better sense of human solidarity. This is
because being together with others does not come first by comprehension but by
being responsible for others even to the strangers I meet along the way.
Conclusion
Maintaining the claim
that human solidarity is always part of our human existence, it becomes a subject
that must not be taken for granted. As social being, we can neither escape ourselves
in meeting other people where an avenue of solidarity is just within reach. However,
the prevailing conception of solidarity as influenced by Aristotle has limited itself
by taking commonality as its primary basis. In effect of such paradigm is the
emergence of “categorized” solidarities which in some way have failed to serve their
purpose for they only provoke division and violence. Such an inadequacy has led
this paper to affirm Emmanuel Levinas’ thought as an alternative view that
concerns for a better sense of solidarity. For Levinas, it is not the “sameness”
but the otherness of the Other that must be the binding factor of solidarity. This
is because in my ethical relation with the Other, the Other’s otherness demands
a different response not in a form of comprehension of sameness but responsibility.
In such a manner, there is a hope that a stronger sense of solidarity would established
in applying the philosophy of Levinas for “responsibility tolerates no delays”.[46]
In presenting the Levinas’
philosophical exposition of the ethical relation with the Other and all Others,
I do not intend to propose a revolutionary shift of viewpoint as if it were the
only possible paradigm in search for solidarity. This presentation of the
alternative paradigm works as a form of invitation to reflect our own sense of
solidarity. Like Emmanuel Levinas’ the Other, the content of this paper does
not impose its will nor subjugate your freedom but commands your generosity.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Works by Emmanuel Levinas
Books
Levinas,
Emmanuel. Alterity and Transcendence. Translated by
Michael B. Smith. New Yrok: Columbia
University
________________.
Basic Philosophical Writings. Edited
by Adrian T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi. Indiana : Indiana
University
________________.
Ethics and Infinity. Conversation with
Philippe Nemo. Translated by Richard Cohen. Pittsburgh :
Duquesne University
________________.
Totality and Infinity. An Essay on
Exteriority. Transalated by by Alphonso Lingis. Pennsylvania :
Duquesne University
Works on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas
Books
Burggraeve,
Roger. The Wisdom of Love in the Service
of Love: Emmanuel Levinas on Justice, Peace and Human Rights. Translated by
Jeffrey Bloechl. Milwaukee : Marquette University
Peperzak,
Adrian T. Beyond: The Philosophy of
Emmanuel Levinas. Illinois
Unpublished Materials
Capili,
April. “Levinas on Creation, Subjectivity
and Responsibility”,(2008). 1-7.
Araneta
Marlone. “Emmanuel Levinas’s Being-Responsible
for Others as an Ethical Basis for Peace in Mindanao .”
Masters Thesis, Ateneo De Manila University, 2006.
Works on Human Solidarity
Books
Dy
Jr., Manuel. Contemporary Social
Philosophy, Quezon City
Unpublished Article
Moga,
Micheal Fr. “Human Solidarity”. 1-10.
Online Sources
Collins
English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged, (HarperCollins Publishers 1991,
1994, 1998, 2000, 2003); available from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/solidarity;
Internet. Accessed 01 February 2011.
Lourdes
Quisumbing, “Values Education for Human Solidarity,” available from http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/QuisumbingSolidarity.pdf;
Internet. Accessed 08 February 2011.
Micheal
Hoelzl, “Recognizing the Sacrificial Victim: The Problem of Solidarity for
Critical Social Theory,” Journal for
Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 6 no. 1 (December 2004): [journal-online]
45-64. PURL: http://www.jcrt.org/archives/06.1/hoelzl.pdf; Internet. Accessed 21 January 2011.
David
Kahane, “Diversity, Solidarity and Civic Friendship,” Journal of Political Philosophy (1999) [journal on-line]; available
from http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/philosophy/pdfs/kahane_solidarity.pdf;
Internet; accessed 01 March 2011.
[1] I am indebted in this part to Fr.
Michael Moga, “Human Solidarity”, 1-9.
[2] I am indebted in this part to Manuel
Dy, “The Social Dimensions of Human Existence,” Contemporary Social Philosophy, (Quezon City: JMC Press, 1994). 1-7.
[4] Ibid., 3.
[8] Kahane,
“Diversity, Solidarity and Civic Friendship,” Journal of Political Philosophy (1999) [journal on-line]; available
from http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/philosophy/pdfs/kahane_solidarity.pdf;
Internet; accessed 01 March 2011. 2.
[16] Available from:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20070905-86932/Frat_elders_responsible_for_cycle_of_violence%2C_says_Reyes
[17] Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas (Illinois: Northwestern Press, 1997), 124.
[18] Levinas, “Transcendence and Height,” Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adrian
Peperzak, et al, (New York: Indiana University Press, 1996), 9.
[19] Araneta
Marlone. “Emmanuel Levinas’s
Being-Responsible for Others as an Ethical
Basis for Peace in Mindanao.” Masters Thesis, (Ateneo De
Manila University, 2006), 100.
[20] Levinas, Ethics
and Infinity: Conversation with Philippe Nemo, translated by Richard Cohen.
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 85-86.
[21] Ibid., 85-86.
[22]
Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversation with Philippe Nemo, 86-87.
[23] Araneta, 103.
[24] April Capili, Levinas on Creation,
Subjectivity and Responsibility, 2.
[25] The Other is approached not in correspondence to her otherness but within
the horizon of comprehension. The understanding of the Other consists in going
beyond the particularity of the Other and placing the Other into horizon
perceiving upon the knowledge of universal. Cited from: Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?,” Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adrian
Peperzak, et al, (New York: Indiana University Press, 1996), 5.
[26] Araneta,112.
[27]
Ibid., 115.
[28] Levinas, Ethics
and Infinity: Conversation with Philippe Nemo, 89.
[29] Levinas, “Transcendence and Height,” 17. (Height explains the other’s appearance
and order as if he were a master while humility explains the element of poverty
present in the face. In its exposure the face is without defense in any acts of
violence).
[30]
Araneta, 112-118.
[31] Capili, 2.
[32] Levinas, Ethics
and Infinity: Conversation with Philippe Nemo, 95.
[33]Levinas, Ethics
and Infinity: Conversation with Philippe Nemo, 96.
[34] Burggraeve,
Roger. The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas on Justice,
Peace and Human Rights, trans. by Jeffrey Bloechl. (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press. 2002), 100.
[35] Levinas, Ethics
and Infinity: Conversation with Philippe Nemo, 97.
[36] Burggraeve, 102.
[37] Burggraeve, 102.
[38] Ibid., 126-127.
[39] Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and
Infinity: An Easy on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pennsylvania,
Duquesne University Press, 1969), 213.
[40] Burggraeve, 127.
[41] Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An
Easy on Exteriority, 213.
[42] Peperzak, 127.
[43] Levinas, Totality
and Infinity: An Easy on Exteriority, 213-214.
[44] Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An
Easy on Exteriority, 213.
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