Summary
Chapter
Five of THE ACTING PERSON
Karol
Wojtyla
Pope
John Paul II
 |
The fact that “I am
wholly engaged in my acting” cannot be
explained by
transcendence alone but
requires for its
interpretation
also the integration
of the person
in the action.
Karol
Wojtyla
In his analysis in the dynamic structure of the
human person, Karol Wojtyla perceived that the “man acts” is not only a
self-determining subject but transcendent and integrated. By transcendence, we
refer to its previously discussed two-fold aspects, namely the horizontal and
the vertical. As a review, horizontal transcendence refers to volition while
vertical transcendence refers to self-determination.[1] It is to this latter that
Karol Wojtyla gave prominence as it is related to man’s immanence, and it is
attributed to the person’s self-determination. Vertical transcendence happens
when man, by determining himself, steps out and stands above himself by
maintaining a dominant role through the exercise of his will and freedom. As an
essential characteristic of the dynamism of the person, vertical transcendence
reveals the possibility of self-determination, for it is by going beyond his
structural boundaries can he only determine himself.
However, the notion of transcendence cannot
fully disclose all the contents of the dynamic reality of the person.[2] Hence, Wojtyla added another
significant structure of the human person, i.e. integration, a complementary to
the notion of the transcendence of the person in the action. “Integration” is
derived from the Latin adjective integer
which means whole, complete, and unimpaired. The term integration, in this
philosophical and psychological discussion, is then used to denote “the
realization and the manifestation of a whole and a unity emerging on the basis
of some complexity rather than assembling into a whole of what was previously
disconnected.”[3]
The dynamic and complex unity of structures of the person is revealed when his
different aspects such as physical, intellectual, emotional, social, spiritual,
among others, all come into unitive play. This explains that when a person
acts, he does not only transcend from himself and maintain a dominant position,
but he is wholly engaged in the act, his entire being is engaged in the act. Hence,
Wojtyla remarked that “the fact that ‘I am wholly engaged in my acting’ cannot
be explained by transcendence alone but requires for its interpretation also
the integration of the person in the action.”[4]
It is probably noteworthy for our discussion to
include the notion of disintegration to understand better the operation of the transcendence
and integration, and their relation to self-determination. In its fundamental
sense, disintegration “signifies what in the structure of self-governance and
self-possession of the person appears as a defect or a failing.”[5] “A disintegrated person is
incapable of governing, or of possessing, himself to the extent that this
inability prevents him from subordinating himself and thus from remaining in
possession of himself.”[6] Thus, there is in this sense
the limit to self-determination for when a person, for instance, suffers from
emotional disturbance and psychological problems, he cannot exercise
self-control and in consequence cannot entirely manifest self-determination.[7] Hence, in relation to transcendence,
“the defects and defaults of integration become, however, the defects and
defaults of transcendence; a fact clearly apparent when we keep in mind that
transcendence and integration are two complementary aspects of the same dynamic
person-action reality.”[8]
What is now the correlation between the
integration and the soma? Karol Wojtyla categorized the integration of the human
person into two dynamisms—the psyche and the soma. In a brief description, the
psyche refers to the affective or emotional dynamism of the person, while the
soma pertains to the bodily dynamism. When man performs action, he shows his
unity or integrity. This unity or integrity for Wojtyla is rooted in the unity
of the soma and the psyche. Our concern here, however, is on the notion of
soma, thus, the notion of psyche will be substantially expounded in the next chapter
of discussion. The term “soma” does not solely mean the “body”, rather it
refers more properly to the bodily functions as they enter into lived experience.[9] When Wojtyla used the term
somatic, he referred to it to the body in the outer that which is visible in
man, and to the inner aspects of the human bodily system; “thus, when we speak
of the somatic dynamism we refer both to the outer reality of the body with its
appropriate members and to its inner reality, that is, the organism: to the
system and the joint functioning of all the bodily organs.”[10] Owing to this somatic
dynamism, man’s corporeality and concreteness is manifested; hence, he is able
to relate with others and come into contact with the world.
Somatic dynamism is identified with “what
happens in man.” However, although not govern by the will, it is in fact
integrated into self-determination for reason that it can take an active role
in man’s acting. For instance, the sense of sight, although may merely be at
the level of the somatic and physical dynamism, for man just sees with his eyes
even without the control of the will, yet still seeing is somehow integrated
into his acting. With this structure of integration, this dynamism is
understood as aspects of the person and therefore has a personal meaning and value.
Somatic dynamism contributes to the unity of the person in action. An act will
definitely be impossible without the movement of the body and an act is
performed with the corresponding physical character, which contributes to the
concrete and final form of the act.[11] This dynamism contributes
to the person as he expresses himself in action. The person is not to be
identified solely with the bodily functions, yet through these, the other
structures of the dynamism of the person find their expressions and
consequently cooperate for the fulfillment of the person.
[1] Aguas, Jove Jim, Person, Action and Love: The Philosophical
Thoughts of Karol Wojtyla, (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2014), 93.
[2] Wojtyla K, The Acting Person, translated from the
Polish by Andrzej Potocki. (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 189.
[3] Ibid, 191.
[4] Ibid, 192.
[5] Ibid, 193.
[6] Ibid, 194.
[7] Aguas, 126.
[8] Wojtyla K, The Acting Person, 194.
[9] Aguas, Jove Jim, Person, Action and Love: The Philosophical
Thoughts of Karol Wojtyla, 128. See
also Simpson, 34.
[10] Wojtyla, 201.
[11] Aguas, 131.
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